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Repetition priming is a form of implicit memory, whereby classification or identification
of a stimulus is improved by prior presentation of the same stimulus. Repetition
priming is accompanied with a deceased fMRI signal for primed vs. unprimed stimuli
in various brain regions, often called “repetition suppression,” or RS. Previous studies
proposed that RS in posterior regions is associated with priming of perceptual processes,
whereas RS in more anterior (prefrontal) regions is associated with priming of conceptual
processes. To clarify which regions exhibit reliable RS associated with perceptual and
conceptual priming, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis using coordinate-based
activation likelihood estimation. This analysis included 65 fMRI studies that (i) employed
visual repetition priming during either perceptual or conceptual tasks, (ii) demonstrated
behavioral priming, and (iii) reported the results from whole-brain analyses. Our results
showed that repetition priming was mainly associated with RS in left inferior frontal gyrus
and fusiform gyrus. Importantly, RS in these regions was found for both perceptual
and conceptual tasks, and no regions show RS that was selective to one of these
tasks. These results question the simple distinction between conceptual and perceptual
priming, and suggest consideration of other factors such as stimulus-response bindings.
Keywords: repetition priming, meta-analysis, fMRI, perceptual, conceptual, stimulus-response bindings
INTRODUCTION
Priming refers to behavioral changes in the identification, production, or classification of a
stimulus caused by a previous encounter with the same or a similar stimulus (Tulving and
Schacter, 1990). Priming has been associated with implicit, or unconscious, memory, because it
is normally unaffected by brain lesions that cause impairments of conscious or explicit memory,
i.e., amnesia (Gabrieli et al., 1995; Keane et al., 1995), and because it is measured by tasks
that do not require explicit memory for the previous encounter. Over the last few decades,
the neural bases of priming have been studied extensively with functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). Specifically, fMRI studies found that repeated processing of a primed stimulus
is associated with decreased responses in various brain regions. This phenomenon is called
repetition suppression (RS; for review, see Grill-Spector et al., 2006). RS has therefore been
proposed as a neural signature of behavioral priming (e.g., Schacter and Buckner, 1998; Wiggs
and Martin, 1998; Henson, 2003; Gotts et al., 2012), though in fact direct correlations between
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the size of RS and the amount of behavioral priming are rarely
reported (Schacter et al., 2007), and when they are found, such
behavioral correlations are mainly with RS in frontal brain
regions (e.g., Dobbins et al., 2004; Maccotta and Buckner, 2004;
Horner and Henson, 2008).
Kim (2016) performed a meta-analysis of fMRI studies
to clarify which brain regions exhibit reliable RS. A meta-
analytic approach is important to account for different
statistical thresholds across studies, and potentially to generalize
over differences in stimuli and task. Kim collected 1,020
coordinates of peak foci from 106 experiments and 1,454
participants. The results showed consistent RS in bilateral inferior
frontal cortex and ventral occipitotemporal cortex. Kim (2016)
suggested that RS in ventral occipitotemporal cortex reflects
facilitated perceptual processing (since all the experiments
used visual stimuli), while RS in inferior frontal cortex
reflects some combination of facilitated conceptual processing,
automatized stimulus-response mapping, less demand for top-
down enhancement, and reductions in novelty. Additionally,
Kim found that most regions showing RS for one type of
visual stimulus also showed RS for other types. For example,
direct comparisons between words, non-words, scenes, faces, and
objects indicated that ventral occipitotemporal cortex shows RS
regardless of type of visual stimulus.
In addition to RS, repeated stimulus presentation can result
in enhanced brain responses relative to its first presentation,
or “repetition enhancement” (RE). While RE is most often
reported in brain regions associated with explicit memory, most
likely reflecting incidental conscious memory for the previous
encounter with a stimulus (even though that encounter is
irrelevant to performance of priming tasks), it has occasionally
been reported in brain regions associated with priming, and
which show RS under other conditions (see Schacter et al., 1995;
Dolan et al., 1997; George et al., 1999; Henson et al., 2000).
However, Kim’s (2016) meta-analysis searched for the terms
“repetition suppression” and “neural priming” to identify initial
candidate articles, many of which may not have reported
concurrent behavioral priming. As far as we are aware, the only
meta-analyses of behavioral priming and its neural correlates
have focused on specific priming paradigms, such as negative
priming (e.g., a slowing rather than speeding of responses
to repeated stimuli; Yaple and Arsalidou, 2017), semantic
priming (e.g., speeded responding to a target preceded by a
semantically related prime; Rodd et al., 2015) and processing
of subliminal stimuli (Brooks et al., 2012; Meneguzzo et al.,
2014). Therefore, the first goal of the present study was to
restrict the meta-analysis to studies that reported significant
behavioral priming (in implicit memory tasks), but expand this
across a range of different repetition priming paradigms (such
as speeded classification, item identification, and word-stem
completion, but excluding negative priming, semantic priming,
and masked/subliminal priming), and to allow for RE as well
as RS. Like Kim, we used activation likelihood estimation (ALE;
Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012; Turkeltaub et al., 2012) to determine
the convergence of statistical peaks showing RS and RE.
Furthermore, we distinguished two different types of
repetition priming (Schacter and Buckner, 1998): perceptual
priming and conceptual priming. Perceptual processing relies
on the physical characteristics of the stimuli, or “data-driven”
processes, whereas conceptual priming relies on the meaning of
the stimuli, or “conceptually-driven” processes (Jacoby, 1983;
Blaxton, 1989). Since we examined only repetition priming
but not semantic, relatedness or associative priming in this
meta-analysis, perceptual priming denotes “repetition priming
in perceptual tasks” and conceptual priming denotes “repetition
priming in conceptual tasks.” Examples of commonly-used
perceptual priming tasks include perceptual identification
(naming words or objects as quickly as possible) and word-
stem/fragment completion (producing the first word that
comes to mind in response to a cue representing part of that
word); examples of conceptual priming tasks include category
generation/association (generating several exemplars of a cued
category) and conceptual classification (e.g., deciding as quickly
as possible whether an object is living or non-living). Numerous
psychological studies have reported behavioral dissociations
between these two types of priming (e.g., in terms of their
sensitivity to other psychological factors; see Roediger and
McDermott, 1993 for review).
Early neuropsychological support for a neural dissociation
between perceptual vs. conceptual priming arose in patients
with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). While AD can damage many
areas of the brain, particularly as the disease progresses, the
damage is normally greatest in medial temporal lobe structures,
and is least in early sensory regions. Consistent with this,
AD patients generally show intact perceptual priming (Buckner
et al., 1995; Fleischman et al., 1995; Gabrieli et al., 1995; Keane
et al., 1995) despite defective conceptual priming (Salmon et al.,
1988; Monti et al., 1996; Gabrieli et al., 1999). However, the
preservation of conceptual priming in AD has been reported
in some studies (Grosse et al., 1990; Meiran and Jelicic, 1995;
Fleischman and Gabrieli, 1998). These discrepancies might
reflect differences in task characteristics, or owe to the highly
variable and diffuse extent of pathology in AD, which also
depends on the stage of the progressive neurodegenerative
disease (Fleischman et al., 2005; Fleischman, 2007). Other studies
have examined patients with more focal, acquired lesions. For
example, Gong et al. (2016) used a picture identification task
(i.e., perceptual priming) and a category exemplar generation
task (i.e., conceptual priming) to study patients with occipital
vs. frontal lobe lesions. They found that the performance of
perceptual priming was poorer in occipital lesion group, whereas
the performance of conceptual priming was poorer in frontal
lesion group. Thus, these neuropsychological studies support a
double dissociation, with occipital cortex supporting perceptual
priming and frontal cortex supporting conceptual priming.
Neuroimaging studies have provided some further support for
the claim that perceptual and conceptual priming are associated
with different brain regions (Schacter and Buckner, 1998;
Schacter et al., 2007). As might be expected from the component
process view (Schacter and Buckner, 1998; Henson, 2003),
according to which RS reflects facilitation of specific processes
involved in a given task, perceptual priming tends to produce RS
in more sensory-related regions, such as occipitotemporal gyrus
for visual stimuli, while conceptual priming tends to produce
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RS in frontotemporal regions (e.g., inferior frontal gyrus and
inferior temporal cortex). Moreover, some studies have found
correlations between the size of the behavioral priming effect in
conceptual priming tasks and the amount of RS in inferior frontal
gyrus (Lustig and Buckner, 2004; Maccotta and Buckner, 2004;
Bunzeck et al., 2006; Turk-Browne et al., 2006; Soldan et al., 2010)
or fusiform gyrus (Turk-Browne et al., 2006; Soldan et al., 2010),
though such correlations are not always reported. Interestingly,
these correlations are normally found with RS in inferior frontal
gyrus and conceptual priming, as measured by reduced RTs in
semantic classification tasks; we are not aware of any study that
has found a correlation between RS in occipitotemporal areas and
measures of perceptual priming, e.g., reduced RTs in perceptual
priming tasks.
An alternative to the component process view of RS is the
hypothesis that RS reflects retrieval of stimulus-response (S-R)
bindings (for review, see Henson et al., 2014). According to
this view, the response made on the initial stimulus is bound
to that stimulus, such that when the stimulus is repeated, the
response can be generated without repeating the perceptual and
conceptual component processes that were initially engaged to
produce that response, resulting in reduced activity in relevant
regions. On the contrary, if S-R bindings are no longer relevant,
those brain regions are equal active for repeated and initial
processing, causing an absence of RS. The first neuroimaging
evidence for this possibility came fromDobbins et al. (2004), who
showed that simply reversing the task in a semantic classification
paradigm abolished RS in fusiform and frontal cortex. Their
argument was that responding to the first presentation of a
stimulus creates a unique S-R binding, such that when that
stimulus is primed, the S-R binding can be retrieved and
used to generate the response, bypassing the need for repeated
perceptual or conceptual processing. Subsequent studies (e.g.,
Horner and Henson, 2008, 2011; Race et al., 2008) showed
that task reversal (or other ways to reduce the influence of S-
R bindings) does not always abolish RS in occipitotemporal
regions, though it invariably does so in frontal regions (and
indeed, sometimes reversing the S-R contingency can produce
RE rather than RS in frontal regions; Horner and Henson, 2011).
While the contributions of S-R bindings do not rule out a role
for occipiotemporal cortex in perceptual priming or inferior
frontal cortex in conceptual priming, they do confound many
behavioral measures of priming (particularly those using speeded
classification tasks; Horner and Henson, 2009), and it is possible
that the correlations found between RS in inferior frontal gyrus
and priming in conceptual priming tasks actually reflects retrieval
of S-R bindings, i.e., does not reflect facilitated conceptual
processing. Thus, the second goal of our meta-analysis was to
see whether the brain regions showing RS differed according to
perceptual vs. conceptual priming, or if not, to consider whether
a common pattern of results could owe to S-R bindings.
Our final goal relates to the nature of the stimuli used.
Many studies assume they are measuring conceptual priming
because they use a task that requires conceptual processing, even
though the stimuli are also repeated in the same perceptual
format, and therefore the neural and/or behavioral consequences
of priming can include additional perceptual processes. To
isolate “purer” conceptual priming, some studies have examined
priming and RS across a change in the perceptual format (e.g.,
from pictures to words, e.g., Simons et al., 2003). Therefore, we
performed a sub-analysis of conceptual priming studies in which
different exemplars of stimuli were used for primed vs. unprimed
conditions (even though the same “concept” was repeated).
In sum, the three objectives of this meta-analysis are (1) to
identify the brain regions with the most consistent RS and RE
across fMRI studies that show concurrent behavioral priming, (2)
to test whether different brain regions show RS for perceptual
vs. conceptual priming, and (3) to further examine the RS
associated with conceptual priming across stimuli with minimal
perceptual overlap.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study followed Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines (Moher et al.,
2009).
Literature Search and Selection Criteria
A literature search for human fMRI studies on behavioral
priming up to October 31, 2018 was initiated via the
PubMed (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) search engine. The
search under “(perceptual priming OR conceptual priming OR
repetition priming) AND (fMRI OR functional MRI)” produced
a total of 308 relevant studies. The following criteria were used
on the selection of these articles for evaluation and analysis
(Figure 1):
1. Only studies conducting fMRI on healthy participants
were selected.
2. Only studies using implicit, priming tasks, such as perceptual
identification, naming, and conceptual judgment (e.g.,
semantic categorization) were selected. Those using
passive viewing, motor learning, and explicit memory
tasks were excluded. Negative priming, semantic priming,
and masked/subliminal priming were not the focus of this
meta-analysis, so studies using them were also excluded.
3. Only studies showing significant behavioral priming were
selected. Priming was assessed by a decrease in reaction time,
an increase in accuracy, or a bias in response to primed
stimulus. When the behavioral results are collected with a
separate group of participants different from those in the
fMRI experiments, only studies using the same design in both
behavioral and fMRI experiments were included.
4. Only studies using visual stimuli were included, such as words
or pictures, since visual stimulation has been the dominant
modality in fMRI studies. Note that some studies primed the
same “item,” but in a different visual format the first vs. second
time (e.g., the word “apple” followed by a picture of an apple).
5. To be compatible with ALE approach, only studies showing
peak coordinate foci in either Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) or Talairach space for a whole-brain analysis were
included. Those involving region of interest (ROI) analyses
were excluded. We only included whole-brain analyses in
order to increase the number of the foci and thus the power
of each individual meta-analysis.
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FIGURE 1 | PRISMA flow chart for procedure of study selection.
The above criteria resulted in the selection of 51 studies. Through
reviewing the reference lists of the collected papers, additional 14
relevant studies that passed the selection criteria were collected,
producing 65 in total.
Contrasts (i.e., experiments) from these studies were extracted
for analysis. The contrasts used for identifying RS were New
> Old, Novel > Repeated, or First presentation > Second
presentation; contrasts for RE were the opposite, i.e., New<Old,
Novel < Repeated, or First presentation < Second presentation.
To minimize the possibility that meta-analytic results are driven
by within-experiment and within-group effects (Turkeltaub et al.,
2012), at most one RS contrast and one RE contrast from one
experiment within each study was selected. This resulted in 27
studies reporting both RS and RE, 38 studies reporting RS only,
and none of them reporting only RE.
Some of these studies demonstrated RS and/or RE in more
than one contrast. For instance, the experiment of (Bunzeck
et al., 2006) involved two stimulus categories, faces and scenes.
Behavioral priming, as well as RS and RE were observed in
both categories. Under this circumstance, we collected only the
contrasts that involved all stimulus types (e.g., new faces and
scenes > old faces and scenes for RS, and old faces and scenes
> new faces and scenes for RE). If the studies did not report
the results from the contrast All novel > All repeated for RS, or
All novel < All repeated for RE, we chose the contrasts from the
most typical stimulus type (e.g., neutral faces instead of emotional
faces; words instead of pseudowords). However, eight studies
included two contrasts for RS and/or RE because the contrasts
were from different groups of participants (e.g., young and old;
Daselaar et al., 2005; Bergerbest et al., 2009; Ballesteros et al.,
2013), different tasks (Schott et al., 2005; Zago et al., 2005), or
different types of stimuli (e.g., objects and words; Chouinard
and Goodale, 2012; Heusser et al., 2013). Overall, the 65 studies
provided data for 100 experiments.
Data Analysis
Five sets of meta-analyses were performed. The first meta-
analysis analyzed all of the priming experiments reporting RS
(n = 72). Second, the experiments showing RE were analyzed
(n= 28).
For the third analysis, every experiment was classified as
perceptual priming task or conceptual priming task based on the
type of task used. Perceptual priming tasks were defined as those
involved data-driven processes such as word-stem completion,
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TABLE 1 | Number of experiments and included tasks in perceptual and
conceptual priming.
RS RE Task Number of
experiments
Perceptual 27 11 Reading/naming/identification 16
Lexical decision 10
Perceptual judgment 7
Word-stem completion 5
Conceptual 45 17 Conceptual judgment 59
Category generation 3
Total 72 28
lexical decision, naming, and perceptual identification (n =
27). Conceptual priming tasks were defined as those involved
conceptually driven processes including category generation and
the conceptual judgment (n = 45). Table 1 lists the number
and tasks of perceptual and conceptual priming experiments;
the supplementary material available online provides a more
detailed description of all of the studies and experiments in
the meta-analysis.
For comparison of conceptual and perceptual priming,
we performed both a conjunction analysis (looking for
commonalities) and a subtraction analysis (looking for
differences in RS between conceptual vs. perceptual priming).
A fourth meta-analysis investigated conceptual priming
without perceptual overlap, that is, the stimuli were primed
by different object exemplars, views, or segments (n = 5).
Finally, since picture naming has been proposed to involve both
perceptual and conceptual processing (see Discussion), in a fifth
analysis, we repeated the conjunction and subtraction analyses
but after removing the 6 studies that used picture naming.
Meta-Analysis Techniques
The software GingerALE 2.3.6 (http://www.brainmap.org/ale)
was used to conduct the ALE meta-analyses and the conversion
of coordinates reported in MNI space into Talairach space. The
ALE meta-analysis is a coordinate-based method capable of
determining the brain regions showing an above-chance level of
activation convergence across a set of independent studies. In
the ALE approach, the foci extracted from the selected studies
are not treated as single points, but rather are modeled as the
centers of three-dimensional Gaussian probability distribution
taking into account spatial uncertainty due to the between-
subject and between-template variance (Eickhoff et al., 2009).
The width of probability distributions (i.e., full-width at half-
maximum, FWHM) is determined by the number of subjects
in each experiment. The probabilities of all activation foci in
a certain experiment were then combined for each voxel by
taking the union, yielding a modeled activation map (MA map).
Voxel-wise ALE scores resulted from the union across the MA
maps among the experiments that represented the likelihood of
activation convergent at particular locations.
To enable spatial inference on these ALE scores, a p-value was
calculated for each voxel based on the probability of observing an
ALE value higher than the value under the null-distribution. This
is achieved by randomly relocating ALE values throughout the
brain, that is, via random permutation. In this study, the p-values
were generated by 10,000 permutations. Followed by guidelines
recommended by the developers of this method (Eickhoff et al.,
2012), the statistical maps were finally thresholded at family-wise
error (FWE) corrected p < 0.05 with an initial cluster-forming
threshold of uncorrected p< 0.001 to enforce a minimum cluster
size. The threshold of contrast analysis was set at p < 0.05, FDR
corrected, with permutations = 10,000 and minimum volume
= 0 mm3. GingerALE employs the term “contributing studies,”
to describe studies that are located within the boundaries of
ALE cluster. However, it is possible that other studies located
near these boundaries but outside of the cluster could have also
contributed to it.
The thresholded ALE result images were visualized
using the Mango 4.0.1 (San Antonio, TX: UT Health
Science Center Research Imaging Institute) and
overlaid onto a Talairach-based anatomical template
(http://www.brainmap.org/ale/colin_tlrc_2x2x2.nii). Local
maxima of activation clusters were anatomically labeled with
visual reference to an anatomical atlas provided by Mango. The
clusters in the result tables were ordered by region, from frontal,
parietal, to occipitotemporal region.
RESULTS
Repetition Suppression in All Priming
Tasks
Results of the meta-analysis on the occurrences of repetition
suppression (RS) from all priming experiments (n = 72)
are shown in Table 2, Figure 2. These experiments contained
751 activation foci from 1,128 participants. RS was mainly
associated with the bilateral fusiform gyrus (FG), inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG), and middle occipital gyrus. More specifically, the
significant clusters were centered within the bilateral FG, left
IFG, right cingulate gyrus, right precentral gyrus, right middle
occipital gyrus, and left precuneus.
Repetition Enhancement in All Priming
Tasks
The meta-analysis of 28 experiments reporting repetition
enhancement (RE) contained 158 activation foci from 421
participants. The results showed the significant clusters located
in the bilateral precuneus and left middle frontal gyrus (Table 2,
Figure 2).
Repetition Suppression in Perceptual and
Conceptual Priming Tasks
From 263 foci and 422 subjects in 27 perceptual priming
experiments, the ALE analysis revealed three significant clusters
including the left FG, left middle frontal gyrus and left insula
(Table 3, Figure 3). The ALE analysis of 488 foci and 706 subjects
in 45 conceptual priming experiments revealed 9 clusters in the
bilateral FG, bilateral IFG, bilateral middle frontal gyrus, and
bilateral middle occipital gyrus (Figure 3).
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TABLE 2 | Brain regions showing RS or RE across all priming contrasts.
Cluster Cluster ALE Talairach Region No. of
no. size Value coordinates contributing
(mm3) experiments
x y z %
RS in all priming tasks (n = 72)
1 6,936 0.069 −40 4 28 L inferior frontal gyrus 26 36.11
0.046 −46 24 18 L inferior frontal gyrus
2 4,144 0.048 −34 28 −4 L inferior frontal gyrus 23 31.94
0.031 −46 36 2 L inferior frontal gyrus
0.029 −30 20 6 L insula
0.026 −52 12 6 L precentral gyrus
3 3,960 0.045 6 18 42 R cingulate gyrus 15 20.83
0.032 −2 14 48 L superior frontal gyrus
0.028 −4 4 52 L medial frontal gyrus
4 2,192 0.035 36 0 30 R precentral gyrus 15 20.83
0.021 48 10 26 R inferior frontal gyrus
5 1,568 0.034 42 28 18 R middle frontal gyrus 10 13.89
6 960 0.026 −26 −74 24 L precuneus 7 9.72
7 14,168 0.051 −34 −44 −18 L culmen 47 65.28
0.047 −44 −60 −10 L fusiform gyrus
0.027 −26 −86 6 L middle occipital gyrus
0.025 −40 −72 2 L middle occipital gyrus
0.023 −24 −72 −12 L Declive
0.022 −32 −78 −8 L Inferior Occipital
Gyrus
8 7,200 0.049 40 −58 −6 R fusiform gyrus 31 43.06
0.046 28 −38 −16 R fusiform gyrus
0.024 24 −60 −8 R fusiform gyrus
0.023 44 −68 −6 R inferior occipital
gyrus
0.019 42 −42 −10 R fusiform gyrus
9 1544 0.027 34 −78 12 R middle occipital gyrus 9 12.50
0.027 38 −76 4 R middle occipital gyrus
RE in all priming tasks (n = 28)
1 800 0.019 −28 44 6 L middle frontal gyrus 4 14.29
2 1,776 0.019 −8 −64 30 L cuneus 7 25.00
0.016 −10 −72 40 L precuneus
3 1,088 0.017 6 −52 38 R precuneus 5 17.86
0.016 4 −54 44 R precuneus
Common regions showing RS for both perceptual and
conceptual priming were calculated using a conjunction analysis
(Figure 4). The overlapping regions were left FG and left IFG.
The differences between RS during perceptual and conceptual
priming were analyzed by performing subtraction analysis across
their thresholded ALE maps. A direct contrast between the two
types of priming showed no significant cluster.
Repetition Suppression in Conceptual
Priming Tasks Without Perceptual Overlap
To address whether RS in the fusiform and occipital gyri during
conceptual priming tasks is caused by repetition of the same
stimulus, in a separate analysis we included only experiments in
which primed stimuli were perceptually different from unprimed
stimuli (i.e., different exemplars, views, and segments) (n = 5).
The results of the meta-analysis still showed consistent RS in one
area, the left FG.
Repetition Suppression in Perceptual
Priming Tasks Without Picture Naming
Six studies using picture naming task were excluded from
perceptual priming because it has been proposed that naming
involves conceptual processing as well (see Discussion). The
remaining 21 perceptual priming experiments contained 218
activation foci from 347 participants. Only one region, the left
FG, was now revealed by the conjunction analysis (i.e., the
IFG was no longer present), though still no region showed an
interaction between RS and perceptual/conceptual priming in the
subtraction analysis.
DISCUSSION
The present study performedmeta-analyses across 65 studies that
used fMRI to study the neural correlates of behavioral repetition
priming. When including all studies, repetition suppression (RS)
was consistently observed in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG) and fusiform gyrus (FG); whereas repetition enhancement
(RE) was consistently shown in bilateral precuneus and middle
frontal gyrus. Interestingly, a conjunction analysis showed that
RS occurred in left IFG and left FG during both perceptual and
conceptual priming tasks, and a subtraction analysis provided
no evidence for any region implicated in one task but not the
other. In other words, there was little evidence for a qualitative
dissociation between the neural correlates of perceptual and
conceptual priming.
RS in Fusiform Gyrus and Inferior Frontal
Gyrus
The prevalence of RS in FG and IFG is consistent with
the previous meta-analyses on RS (Kim, 2016, 2019), which
included many of the same studies, but did not restrict analysis
to those studies that showed concurrent behavioral priming.
However, our results did not show RS in hippocampus, which is
believed to reflect priming of relational processing of information
(Kim, 2019), most likely because most of the studies here
used single-item priming. Given the debate about whether
hippocampus is only involved in explicit memory, or can also be
involved in implicit relational memory (e.g., Henke, 2010), more
neuroimaging studies are needed on implicit relational priming.
Previous neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies on
priming have suggested that the occipitotemporal and frontal
regions are the critical areas for mediating perceptual and
conceptual priming, respectively (Wiggs and Martin, 1998;
Schacter et al., 2007; Gong et al., 2016). The component
process view proposes that RS reflects the facilitation of
processes that are engaged during both initial and primed
presentation of a stimulus, and therefore occurs in brain regions
specialized for those processes (Schacter and Buckner, 1998;
Henson, 2003). For instance, RS in occipitotemporal regions
(such as fusiform cortex) is thought to reflect the facilitation
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FIGURE 2 | Brain regions showing the occurrences of RS (red) and RE (green) from an ALE meta-analysis of all priming experiments.
of visual perceptual processes (Blaxton, 1999; Henson, 2003),
whereas RS in prefrontal regions (such as inferior frontal
gyrus) is thought to reflect the facilitation of conceptual
processes (Wagner et al., 1997, 2000). However, our meta-
analysis provided less support for this putative division of labor,
since we found that FG showed RS for both perceptual and
conceptual priming, and IFG showed RS for conceptual and/or
perceptual priming.
Prima facie, this is inconsistent with the component process
view. However, it is possible that the studies we assigned to
examples of perceptual vs. conceptual priming were not “process
pure,” in the sense that both perceptual and conceptual processes
might have been facilitated, even if the stimuli and task were
designed to emphasize one type of process over the other. This
ambiguity might have led to the wrong contrasts/studies being
assigned to the wrong category of conceptual vs. perceptual
in this meta-analysis, and might even explain why a clear
dissociation was not found between these two types of priming.
An example of this would be in studies of conceptual priming that
use a semantic task (assumed to engage conceptual processes)
but also repeat the stimulus in the same format (e.g., words),
which is likely to result in concurrent facilitation of perceptual
processes too. However, when we performed a subsidiary analysis
of just those studies that changed the (visual) format of the initial
and primed presentation of an item, there was still evidence of
RS in FG (though it is worth noting that the number for this
analysis of “pure” conceptual priming is below the number of
17–20 experiments suggested by Eickhoff et al., 2016). While it
is possible that FG is involved in conceptual processes as well
as IFG, this finding questions the neuroimaging support for the
neural dissociation between conceptual and perceptual priming
(e.g., from neuropsychological data).
We also found RS in IFG for perceptual priming, which is
discussed even less in the literature, and not easy to explain by
the component process view. However, another debate concerns
studies using picture naming. Picture naming was included as
an example of perceptual processing in early studies (Wiggs
and Martin, 1998). Subsequent research however, particularly
using bilingual participants, suggests that picture naming can
be decomposed into object identification and word production:
object identification is assumed to be a perceptual process,
whereas word production requires conceptual access (Francis
and Sáenz, 2007; Francis et al., 2008; for review, see Francis,
2020). Factor analysis has also suggested that picture naming
taps both perceptual and conceptual factors (Bruss and Mitchell,
2009). We therefore performed a further sub-analysis after
having removed studies using picture naming. While there was
still no region showing a significant difference in RS between
perceptual and conceptual priming in the subtraction analysis,
the conjunction analysis now revealed a common RS only in FG.
Thus, we cannotmake strong conclusions about the role of IFG in
perceptual priming, if naming tasks are excluded as an example
of perceptual priming: it could be that IFG is only involved in
conceptual priming, or the lack of IFG in our sub-analysis could
be a false negative owing to the reduced sample size. Further
studies are needed to resolve this question, and dissociate the
perceptual vs. conceptual contributions to naming.
An alternative interpretation of our findings is that RS in
IFG and FG reflects the retrieval of S-R bindings, cued by the
repetition of a stimulus, where this rapid and direct retrieval of
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TABLE 3 | Brain regions showing RS in perceptual and conceptual priming
separately.
Cluster Cluster ALE Talairach Region No. of
no. size Value coordinates contributing
(mm3) experiments
x y z %
RS in perceptual priming tasks (n = 27)
1 712 0.017 −42 26 18 L middle frontal gyrus 4 14.81
2 672 0.019 −52 −38 24 L insula 5 18.52
3 3,440 0.023 −42 −60 −10 L fusiform gyrus 15 55.56
0.021 −44 −60 −2 L middle temporal
gyrus
0.017 −46 −48 −14 L fusiform gyrus
0.014 −40 −70 4 L middle occipital gyrus
RE in conceptual priming tasks (n = 45)
1 5,720 0.065 −40 4 28 L inferior frontal gyrus 19 42.22
0.035 −48 24 20 L inferior frontal gyrus
2 2,664 0.035 −34 30 −4 L inferior frontal gyrus 14 31.11
0.026 −30 20 6 L insula
0.020 −44 20 6 L inferior frontal gyrus
3 3,376 0.042 6 18 42 R cingulate gyrus 12 26.67
0.032 −2 14 48 L superior frontal gyrus
0.016 −2 4 52 L superior frontal gyrus
4 2,320 0.032 42 28 18 R middle frontal gyrus 12 26.67
0.024 34 20 10 R insula
0.019 46 12 22 R inferior frontal gyrus
5 1,448 0.031 36 0 30 R precentral gyrus 9 20.00
6 8,584 0.048 −32 −44 −20 L culmen 27 60.00
0.032 −44 −54 −12 L fusiform gyrus
0.027 −44 −62 −10 L fusiform gyrus
7 5,496 0.038 30 −44 −14 R fusiform gyrus 21 46.67
0.036 40 −58 −6 R fusiform gyrus
0.016 42 −70 −8 R inferior occipital
gyrus
8 1,656 0.021 −28 −74 22 L precuneus 11 24.44
0.021 −34 −76 16 L middle occipital gyrus
0.020 −26 −84 2 L middle occipital gyrus
0.020 −28 −82 −2 L middle occipital gyrus
0.017 −34 −84 10 L middle occipital gyrus
9 1,424 0.025 34 −78 12 R middle occipital gyrus 7 15.56
0.021 38 −78 4 R middle occipital gyrus
a response bypasses the need for “re-running” the component
processes involved on first presentation of the stimulus, leading
to RS (Dobbins et al., 2004; for review, see Henson et al.,
2014). There is compelling evidence that S-R bindings make
a major contribution to behavioral priming in the speeded
classification tasks that were used in the majority of priming tasks
considered here, and such bindings can include multiple, abstract
representations of stimuli, and responses, which would allow
them to generalize across visual format for example (e.g., Horner
and Henson, 2009, 2011). It seems likely that IFG in particular
is involved in control processes like response generation, and
therefore prone to showing the facilitatory effect of retrieving a
response directly from an S-R binding in either perceptual or
conceptual priming. This might explain why the most common
region to show correlations between RS and behavioral priming
in previous studies is IFG. The role of FG in retrieving S-R
bindings is less clear, particularly when residual RS in FG has
been found despite minimizing the contribution of S-R bindings
(Horner and Henson, 2008; Race et al., 2008), and when there
have been few reports that FG RS correlates with behavioral
priming. It is possible that facilitation of perceptual processes
(according to component process view) does occur in FG, but this
explains only a minor proportion of the variance in behavioral
priming (compared that attributed to decision processes in IFG).
This hybrid account (perceptual facilitation in FG and S-R
retrieval in IFG) is supported by ERP studies that suggest that
repetition effects in FG are time-locked to stimulus onset, while
repetition effects in IFG are time-locked to response onset (Race
et al., 2008; Horner and Henson, 2011; Wig, 2012).
One way to distinguish the component process account from
the S-R binding account is to manipulate the task (response
requirements) so that S-R bindings become unhelpful, potentially
revealing only the underlying component processes (see Henson
et al., 2014). Indeed, when reversing the task between initial
and primed presentations, such that the responses retrieved
from S-R bindings conflict with those generated by component
processes, IFG can even show RE rather than RS (Horner and
Henson, 2011), suggesting that the S-R binding account explains
the IFG findings better than the component process account.
Unfortunately there were insufficient numbers of studies for the
current meta-analysis to compare tasks where the same response
was repeated (congruent) vs. altered or reversed (incongruent),
which would help interpret the role of RS in the two key areas
of IFG and FG identified here. Another potential approach is
to use techniques like transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
to directly modulate the processing in certain brain regions. For
example, Wig et al. (2005) applied TMS to IFG and found that
both RS in this region, and behavioral priming, were reduced
in a visual object semantic classification task. While this could
be explained by disruption of conceptual processing or retrieval
of S-R bindings, it is interesting that RS in a posterior visual
region (middle occipital gyrus, though not FG) was not affected
by the TMS to IFG, despite the reduction in behavioral priming.
This is consistent with the above hybrid account, where RS
in those regions is related to perceptual facilitation, but this
facilitation makes negligible contribution to behavioral priming
(relative to conceptual facilitation) in semantic tasks like this.
Further evidence to distinguish these possibilities requires TMS
to perceptual regions like FG.
RS in Other Regions
Like Wig et al. (2005), we did find RS in middle occipital gyrus
when considering all priming experiments, but not in conceptual
priming tasks without perceptual overlap, suggesting that this
region is involved in relatively low-level visual processing. Our
results also showed RS in precentral gyrus in all experiments. This
could be related to priming of motor responses, but we think this
is unlikely, because in most studies reviewed, the specific motor
response was orthogonal to the contrast of primed vs. unprimed
trials (e.g., left and right index fingers were pressed equally often
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 565114
Lee et al. Repetition Effects During Priming
FIGURE 3 | Brain regions showing the occurrences of repetition suppression from an ALE meta-analysis of the conceptual (red) and perceptual (green) priming
experiments.
FIGURE 4 | Results of conjunction analysis. Brain regions showing RS for
both conceptual and perceptual priming.
for both primed and unprimed trials) and few studies involved
immediate repetition of the same stimulus and response.
RE in Precuneus and Middle Frontal Gyrus
Only two regions showed RE in the current priming tasks:
precuneus and middle frontal gyrus. Precuneus is a region
that often shows activation for primed vs. initial stimuli in
explicit memory tasks, and has been associated with recollection
and visual imagery in particular. It seems likely that the RE
found in the present implicit tasks reflects incidental (possibly
involuntary) recollection of the initial presentation of a stimulus,
even though such recollection is not needed to perform the
priming task (Donaldson et al., 2001; Henson et al., 2002; Kim
and Yassa, 2013; Gomes et al., 2016; Poppenk et al., 2016; see
also Kim, 2016). An alternative explanation is that precuneus
responds more to easier tasks, e.g., more to primed than novel
objects (Korsnes et al., 2008; Korsnes and Magnussen, 2014).
It is also possible that regions showing RE, such as precuneus,
are “task-negative” regions. Such task-negative regions might
receive less suppressive input from other “task-positive” regions,
leading to RE. The role of RE in middle frontal gyrus is less
clear: it could also reflect incidental explicit memory, though this
region is often associated more with monitoring the products of
explicit memory (Henson et al., 2000) and a typical implicit task
would not seem require such post-retrieval monitoring, unless it
reflects decision processes related to the use of S-R bindings vs.
component processes (see above).
Interestingly, none of the regions typically associated with
priming (e.g., from neuropsychology) showed evidence of RE
(rather than RS). This may be because the majority of studies in
the presentmeta-analysis used pre-experimentally familiar rather
than unfamiliar stimuli (see Henson et al., 2000; Segaert et al.,
2013; Makukhin and Bolland, 2014). Another possibility is that
distinct populations of neurons exhibit suppressed vs. enhanced
responses to primed stimuli (de Gardelle et al., 2013), so that
the overall response of a brain region (or voxel) depends on the
ratio of these neuronal populations. Further studies are needed to
investigate when priming is associated with RE vs. RS, but what
is clear is that the association of RS with implicit memory and RE
with explicit memory is likely to be too simplistic (e.g., Henson,
2003).
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Limitation and Future Directions
The present study possesses inherent limitations of the meta-
analysis approach. First is the most important issue about which
experiments or contrasts are included in the meta-analysis. For
example, we included studies in which stimuli repeat either with
or without intervening trials. However, the neural mechanism
of immediate priming (or fMRI adaptation; Grill-Spector and
Malach, 2001) may differ from priming over longer delays
(e.g., Epstein et al., 2008). Other factors that might affect the
distribution and direction of repetition effects include attention
(Eger, 2004; Yi, 2005), familiarity (Henson et al., 2000; Korsnes
et al., 2008; Soldan et al., 2008, 2010) and number of repetitions
(Müller et al., 2013). We included all these studies in order
to increase the sensitivity of our meta-analysis to the regions
generally associated with priming. A second limitation is that,
while our conjunction analyses provided positive evidence for
shared RS in IFG and FG for conceptual and perceptual priming,
the lack of other regions showing a significant difference in RS
for conceptual and perceptual priming is a null result that cannot
be used to argue that there are no differences. A third limitation
is that ALE calculations do not consider the size of an effect
(only where it is significant). Thus if conceptual and perceptual
priming both produced significant RS in the IFG and FG, but
to differing degrees (e.g., greater RS in IFG for conceptual than
perceptual priming, and greater RS in FG for perceptual than
conceptual priming), then this would not be apparent in the
current type of meta-analysis.
Our results also suggest some possible directions for future
studies. Firstly, Schacter et al. (2007) stated that there is scant
evidence of correlation between RS in posterior regions and
behavioral priming effects. Indeed, there has not been strong
evidence on the correlation of behavioral perceptual priming
and RS in brain regions such as occipital and temporal lobe.
One possibility is that the type of correlation analysis is not
appropriate: Previous studies measured Pearson’s correlation
between the magnitude of priming and RS across subjects.
However, the measurements of correlations across trials within
subject may provide greater sensitivity and avoid other sources of
inter-subject variability.
A second important issue is how IFG communicates
with occipitotemporal gyrus. Some theoretical models such
as synchronization (Gotts et al., 2012) and predictive coding
(Grotheer and Kovács, 2016) emphasize the interaction between
different regions. If so, changes in between-region functional
and effective connectivity should be identified, in addition
to changes in regional activity. For instance, dynamic causal
modeling (DCM) suggested that repetition of body images is
associated with changes in backward (fusiform body area, FBA,
to extrastriate body area, EBA), as well as forward, (EBA-to-FBA),
connections (Ewbank et al., 2011).
Finally, it is surprising that we did not find brain correlates
of conceptual priming in the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) or in
perirhinal cortex, which are both regions that previous lesion and
imaging studies have implicated in semantic processing (Wright
et al., 2015; Ralph et al., 2017). One reason might be the fMRI
signal loss in these regions when using conventional gradient-
echo fMRI acquisition, and future studies could employ methods
to minimize this signal loss.
CONCLUSION
The present meta-analyses identify RS in fusiform gyrus and
inferior frontal gyrus, and RE in precuneus and middle frontal
gyrus, during behavioral priming tasks. The overlap in regions
exhibiting RS across perceptual and conceptual priming is
not predicted by previous studies and reviews, nor expected
based on human lesion data. One alternative to the component
process view is that the inferior frontal RS reflects the retrieval
of S-R bindings, and the fusiform RS reflects the facilitated
perceptual/conceptual processing of the stimuli. Thus, future
studies should attempt to examine how S-R bindings and
component processes interact to determine the magnitude of RS
and priming.
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